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“Our national sense of confidence and advanced national con-
sciousness, given the success of the Olympics, pose on us a new
challenge and obligation that we should fulfill[,] the tusk of join-
ing the advanced nations and achieving full democracy in the
country.” 1 RohTae-Woo, President of South Korea.
In the drama of the Seoul Olympics, South Korea 2became both actor and stage in not only the event itselfbut more in a drive on the part of the city of Seoul to host
the Games. Not many people expected that Seoul would
become the venue of the 1988 Olympics. Even after the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the
Games to Seoul, many people believed that South Korea
would not be an effective host of the world’s biggest sport-
ing event.3 The awarding of the Games’ venue to Seoul was
made despite fears that the Games might be marred by
unfortunate incidents in the tension-ridden, divided coun-
try. The Games were awarded in the wake of a staged mili-
tary coup led by General Chun and only fifteen months
after the tragic and bloody Kwangju pro-democracy upris-
ing of May 1980.4 Moreover, the nation was continually
confronted with the dangerous relations between itself and
North Korea with intermittent bursts of violence. Although
South Korea had grown to become a modern industrial
nation out of the ashes of the Korean War almost three
decades before, no one could tell what Korea would be like
in another seven years when the Games would be held.
The timing virtually ensured that the success or failure
of the 24th Olympic Games would be inextricably linked to
political change in Korea. As many scholars have pointed
out, South Koreans believed the Olympics were tainted
from the beginning by an association with the Chun
regime.5
According to Richard W. Pound, vice-president of the
IOC, the decision to award the Olympic Games to Seoul
was considered: “at best as risky and at worst as recklessly
foolhardy, depending on one’s degree of optimism and
place on the political spectrum.”6
The South Korean military government made the
Olympics its top priority. The Chun government poured
more than three billion dollars into the Olympics and rela-
tive projects. Hosting the Olympic Games was a big gamble
for the unpracticed new military government under
President Chun, but the government was continually
involved in other sport events. Two months after the IOC
decision, the Asian Games Federation also chose Seoul as
the venue for the 10th Asian Games in 1986. 7 At the end of
the same year, the Chun government ordered the creation of
a professional baseball league.8 It was the beginning of a
new era in South Korea, understood by the Koreans as the
“Sport Republic”.
What did the “Sport Republic” mean for the Chun gov-
ernment, and why did the Chun government place sports
enterprises as the nation’s top priority? Various sports
enterprises were important for South Korea’s international
relations as well as internal politics in the 1980s.
Internationally, the Seoul Olympic Games and the Seoul
Asian Games proved South Korea, an adherent of capital-
ism, chances to prove its achievements and national well
being. The Chun government presumed that such interna-
tional athletic events would make the Chun regime legiti-
mate in the eyes of both the people of Korea and the
international community. Internally, international sport
events clearly emphasized nationalism - nationalism and
national unity grounded in traditional Korean loyalty and
patriotism. Therefore, sports events, especially the Seoul
Olympic Games, could be a decisive factor in the resolution
of long-term political tensions. Chun believed that hosting
successful world sport events could bestow prestige and
enhance his authority to govern. Under such circumstances,
fashionable sport entertainment rapidly affected people’s
lives in South Korea. People loved to have a new profes-
sional baseball league and to show pride by hosting presti-
gious world sport events. Yet, sometimes, they watched
baseball games in the stadium with tears in their eyes
because policemen, to obstruct student demonstrations out-
side the stadium, shot tear gas. South Koreans also had to
pay heavy taxes to prepare for hosting world sport events.
However, sports were one of the typical topics of South
Koreans during the Chun regime-the Sport Republic.
To accomplish its objectives, the Chun government had
to overcome many difficulties. There were major problems
in relation to the Seoul Olympic Games. First, North Korea,
jealous of the positive international attention the South
Koreans had received because they were hosting the Asian
Games and the Olympics, might resort to military action,
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either overt or covert. Second, the 37 National Olympic
Committees that did not have diplomatic relations with
South Korea, including the Soviet Union and China, might
boycott the Olympics, perhaps out of solidarity with North
Korea. Third, the promised “first peaceful transition of
power in South Korea’s history,” was scheduled to occur
early in 1988 shortly before the Olympics. There were, how-
ever, possibilities of inciting rioting in the streets, martial
law, and even a military coup. As IOC president Samaranch
stated: “If there is no stability, there will be no Games”.9
Part of the instability the South Korean governmentfaced was the potential Olympic boycott from com-munist countries. Immediately after the IOC’s Seoul
selection, North Korea objected to holding the Olympics in
Seoul. North Korea argued that Seoul, the capital city of
South Korea, was not an appropriate site for the 1988
Olympic Games because of its uncertain internal and
international problems. North Korea’s protests, however,
attracted little attention from its allies. Although most com-
munist countries originally opposed the IOC’s Seoul selec-
tion, they did not give serious attention to North Korea’s
protest. The situation was different from the Soviet Union
and its allies boycotting of the 1984 Los Angeles Games. The
world already experienced two major Olympic boycotts in
the two previous Games, and since most communist coun-
tries did not have diplomatic relationships with South
Korea, no one would guarantee participation for the 1988
Olympics. Moreover, the Soviet Union began to protest the
Seoul Games actively following the Soviets’ shooting down
of a South Korean airliner in September 1983, killing 269
people.10 The Soviets would not favor sending its athletes
to anti-communist country, South Korea, in which serious
anti-Soviet demonstrations were going on. Yet, by late 1984,
the IOC’s firm support for the Seoul Olympics and the
detente of international political situation prevailed over
the potential boycott of the Seoul Games. At the annual
meeting of  the Associat ion of  National  Olympic
Committees in Mexico City following the Los Angeles
Games, a declaration was adopted urging all members to
participate in the 1988 Olympics.11
No member of ANOC spoke against the declaration, not
even North Korea. At an Extraordinary Session of the IOC
in 1984, the IOC formally reiterated its selection of Seoul for
the 1988 Olympics.12
Having failed to persuade the IOC to change the venue
of the 1988 Olympics, North Korea adopted a new tack.
North Korea proposed that the 1988 Olympics be divided
between Seoul and Pyongyang, each hosting half of the
events, and that the two Koreas field a single team. The IOC
felt the need to intervene, setting the stage for a series of
three-way meetings among representatives of the IOC and
the NOC’s of the two Koreas, to negotiate an agreement on
the issue of Pyongyang’s participation in the Seoul
Olympics. The North Korean proposal featured North and
South Korea serving as joint hosts of the Olympiad, while
the Games would be labeled the Chosun or Pyongyang-
Seoul Olympics. The North Korean proposal also main-
tained that North Korea should be allowed to host the same
number of Olympic sports as South Korea, that the orga-
nizing committee should be jointly formed, and that the
revenue from the sale of TV rights should be divided by the
two Koreas. The IOC and South Korea rejected the North
Korea’s proposal. Yet, to guarantee the Games’ success, the
IOC proposed that North Korea be allowed to host all or
part of five Olympic sports - archery, table tennis, women’s
volleyball, a preliminary round of the soccer competition,
and the men’s individual cycling road race. North Korea
agreed in principle to accept the IOC proposal in the third
inter-Korean sports talks in June 1986 but reverted to its for-
mer position in the fourth talks in July 1987, demanding the
right to host more sports. IOC President Juan Antonio
Samaranch, who said the IOC had made its final offer,
asked both Koreas to respond before September 17, 1987,
one year before the opening of the Games. The Seoul
Olympic Organizing Committee announced it would
accept the IOC offer. Pyongyang, however, rejected the pro-
posal and refused to allow IOC officials to travel from
Pyongyang to Seoul via Panmunjon, the truce village in the
demilitarized zone dividing the Korean peninsula.
North Korea’s refusal indicated that free travel by theOlympic Family to and from the two Koreas wouldbe impossible during the Olympic period. Failing
to be made co-host in early January 1988, North Korea
decided to boycott the Seoul Olympics.13
As the Olympics approached, the whole question of elec-
tions and constitutional reform became more and more
urgent, with the political opposition pushing for democrat-
ic reform prior to the Seoul Olympics and the ruling party
favoring the existing system or some variation of it.
On April 13, 1987, President Chun, in a nationwide tele-
vision address, announced plans to suspend the debate
over constitutional reform until after the Olympics. His
announcement sparked weeks of protests in the streets of
Seoul and in dozens of other South Korean cities, in which
growing numbers of citizens joined with students and other
opposition forces. The most violent student demonstrations
in Korean history broke out, and the general public also
strongly disapproved of the decision.14 It was hard to say
with absolute confidence that the country would not be
embattled, or even under martial law at Olympic time. Yet,
such political chaos calmed down after Roh’s famous June
29 Declaration. Roh Tae-Woo, Chun’s hand-picked succes-
sor, announced that all protesters’ demands would be
implemented, including political freedom, relaxed press
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curbs, and direct popular Presidential election. The declara-
tion broke the logjam and opened the way for a successful
hosting of the Olympics - but not completely. 15
After North Korea decided not to participate in the Seoul
Olympics, South Korean students and dissidents demand-
ed the co-hosting of the Olympic Games. By May 1988, less
than a half-year before the Games, the anti-Olympic
demonstrations reached their climax. Yet, the demonstra-
tions did not advance farther because the masses of South
Koreans were justifiable proud of the rapid progress they
had made in social and economic development and wanted
the Games to take place in a stable political environment
befitting their other national accomplishments. Most of the
people did not want anything to disturb the Seoul
Olympics, and the student protests alternatively lacked the
necessary support of the South Korean population.
The Games of the XXIVth Olympiad began September17, 1988 with impressive Opening Ceremonies at theSeoul Olympic Stadium. The Games were the result
of seven years and five months of preparations. The Games
turned out to be a great success for the IOC and South
Korea. Although there were fears of terrorism and a boy-
cott, and there were disputes and divergence on whether it
was wise to hold the Olympics in a divided country in the
preceding years, the Games were held with resounding suc-
cess. In spite of different ideologies and political systems,
the Olympics had brought together the top athletes from
160 countries and regions to compete under the Seoul
Olympic motto of “harmony and progress.” South Korea
failed to have harmony and progress with the most impor-
tant neighbour and people - North Korea. North Korea
remained out of the 1988 Olympic Games although most of
its allies participated in the Games. Despite the lack of coop
eration between North and South Korea, more athletes and
countries competed than at any previous Olympics. The
Seoul Games were also one of the best organized Olympics
with excellent facilities. This vindicated the South Korea’s
confidence in its ability to host the Games successfully.
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